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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN IMMEDIATE LIQUOR
CONTROL PROGRAM FOR WEST VIRGINIA*
FORREST REVERE BLAcKx*

There is a general opinion to the effect that nothing con-

structive can be done in West Virginia with regard to the liquor
traffic until the prohibition amendment is removed from the West
Virginia Constitution.
Article six, section 46 of the West Virginia Constitution
adopted by the people at the general election of 1912 provides:
"On and after the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, the manufacture, sale and keeping for sale
of malt, vinous or spirituous liquors, wine, porter, ale, beer or any
intoxicating drink, mixture or preparation of like nature, except
as hereinafter provided, are hereby prohibited in this State; Provided, however, that the manufacture and sale and keeping for
sale of such liquors for medicinal, pharmaceutical, mechanical,
sacramental and scientific purposes, and the manufacture and sale
of denatured alcohol for industrial purposes may be permitted
under such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe. The
Legislature shall, without delay, enact such laws, with regulations,
conditions, securities and penalties as may be necessary to carry
into effect the provisions of this section."
Article fourteen, section 2 of the West Virginia Constitution
deals with the amending process and provides that the amendment
shall be first adopted by the two houses of the legislature by a two
thirds vote and then submitted to the people at the next general
election, and if a majority of the votes are in favor of the amendment, it shall be in force from the time of such popular ratification.
From the above sections of the West Virginia Constitution
it is clear that the state prohibition amendment cannot be repealed
prior to the November, 1934, election.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the query: what can
be done in the interim? The people of West Virginia have voted
Must the state governto repeal the Eighteenth Amendment.
ment have its hands tied for almost a year before it can carry out
the popular mandate? Confronted with this apparent obstacle,
The interim scheme of liquor control suggested in this article has been
approved by the Kentucky Liquor Control Committee for Kentucky, a state
whose liquor situation is substantially like that of West Virginia.
** Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
*
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LIQUOR CONTROL PROGRAM
many people have been fascinated by, and have declared their
allegiance to, the idea of nullification as the way out of the prohibition muddle. But merely to repeal the state enforcement act
.would leave an unregulated and a non-revenue producing
liquor
traffic, and that would be unthinkable as a solution of the liquor
problem. The nullificationists have toyed with the idea as a
slogan, but have failed to realize thepotential perils implicit in a
negative policy. They have not thought the problem through.
It shall be our purpose to show the potentialities of nullification as a process of government in West Virginia during the
interim until the prohibition amendment can be removed from the
state constitution. Before nullification can be advocated as an
effective process of government for solving the prohibition problem, it is incumbent on its adherents to show (1) that it is possible to raise revenue from the liquor traffic, and (2) that it is
possible to regulate the traffic without having either the revenue
or the regulatory laws declared unconstitutional as in violation of
article six, section 46, which is still in the West Virginia Constitution, and cannot be repealed until November, 1934.
(1) Can the State of West Virginia constitutionally tax the
liquor traffic without authorizing what article six, section 46 of
the state constitution condemns?
Three contentions have been advanced against such a proceeding: (1) that by taxing the business the government recognizes
its lawful character and sanctions its existence, (2) that taxation
and protection are reciprocal, and (3) that for the government to
participate in profits of an illegal business would constitute the
Insofar as a state government is
acceptance of tainted money.
concerned, every one of these contentions was repudiated in a
well-reasoned case decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan in
1875. One of the greatest jurists that this country has produced,
Thomas M. Cooley, spoke for a unanimous court in the case of
Youngblood V. Sexton.'
As to the first contention, Judge Cooley replied that taxes
are not favors; they are burdens. They are necessary, it is true,
to the existence of the government; but they are not the less burdens, and are only submitted to because of necessity. It would be
a remarkable proposition, under such circumstances, that a thing
is sanctioned and countenanced by the government, when this
burden, which may prove disastrous is imposed upon it, while on

132 Mch. 406 (1875).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

the other hand, it is frowned upon and condemned when the burden is withheld. It is safe to predict that if such were the legal
doctrine, any citizen would prefer to be visited with the untaxed
frowns of government rather than with those testimonials of approval which are represented by the demands of the tax gatherer.
It is the usual practice for states to exempt educational and
charitable institutions from taxes. If the argument advanced is
valid, we do not see why the state should not have evidenced its
approbation of educational and charitable institutions by taking
special care that they should feel its burdens, while at the same
time it stigmatized other things which were regarded as immoral
and pernicious, by refusing to permit them to appear on the tax
list. A tax roll would thus become an honor roll. Further, the
taxation of a thing may be and often is, when police purposes
are had in view, a means of expressing disapproval instead of
approbation of what is taxed.
The second contention contains a transparent fallacy. If the
tax upon any particular thing was the consideration for the protection given to the owner in respect to it, the contention might
have some validity. But the maxim of reciprocity in taxation has
no such meaning. No government ever undertakes to tax all that
it protects. If a government were to levy only poll taxes, it would
not be on the idea that it was to protect only the persons of its
citizens, leaving their property to rapine and plunder. On the
other hand, if a state taxed only real property, it would be a
fanciful suggestion that real property was entitled to special protection in consequence. As to the third contention, if this is
tainted money, the state, to be consistent, ought to decline to
receive fines for criminal offenses with the same emphasis that it
would refuse to collect a tax from an obnoxious business.
As early as 1811, a Georgia court construing a state statute,
that imposed a tax of $1,000 on a faro table used for the purpose
of gambling in every different county in which it was so used, held
that the use of the faro table for the purpose of gambling is not
rendered lawful by the tax imposed on the instrument.' So a tax
statute is not unconstitutional because it imposes a privilege tax
upon a business made unlawful by another statute.'
So it has
been held that the fact that a business was prohibited, and license
could not be obtained authorizing it, was no defense to an action
2

State v. Doon and Dimond, R. M. Charlt. 1 (Ga. 1811).
I State ex rel. Melton v. Rombach, 112 Miss. 737, 72 So. 731 (1917).
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to collect the tax imposed from one engaged in such business.'
It is well settled that a tax may be imposed for purposes of revenue
or under the police power for purposes of regulation or prohibition. If it is used for purposes of prohibition, it constitutes a
penalty for carrying on the prohibited business.' Liquor license
fees, in the days before the Volstead Act, were almost unanimously
held to be not a tax, but an exercise of the police power because
regulation was the predominant purpose of the fees.'
The federal cases are in accord with these state cases. In the
case of United States v. Yuginovitc;' Mr. Justice Day, speaking
for a unanimous Supreme Court of the United States, lays down
the proposition that "Congress, under the taxing power, may tax
any intoxicating liquors, notwithstanding their production is prohibited; and the fact that it does so for a moral end as well as to
raise revenue, is not a constitutional objection." In United
States v. Sullivan,' Mr. Justice Holmes, again speaking for a unanimous court, holds that "gains from illegal traffic in liquor are
subject to the income tax." Further, under the doctrine of the
License Tax Cases,' the Supreme Court of the United States said
that the imposition of the license tax on intoxicants did not convey to the licensee any authority to carry on the licensed business
within the state." The licenses give no authority, but are merely
receipts for taxes. From the foregoing authorities, it should be
clear that West Virginia can impose a tax upon a business that is
prohibited and the law will not authorize what Article 6, Section
46 of the West Virginia Constitution condemns. There is thus
ample authority to avoid the intolerable situation of a non-revenue
producing liquor traffic under a policy of nullification.
(2) Can the State of West Virginia constitutionally regulate
the liquor traffic without authorizing what Article 6, Section 46 of
It has been contended that
the State Constitution condemns?
"any conceivable state regulation, short of prohibition itself, would
be a violation of the prohibition adamantly prescribed by the state
The states could not merely regulate, for that
constitution ....
would be to legalize what is unqualifiedly prohibited."'" If this
'Foster v. Speed, 120 Tenn. 470, 111 S. W. 925 (1908).
5 State ex rel. English v. Fanning, 96 Neb. 123, 147 N. W. 215 (1914).
'Henry v. State, 26 Ark. 523 (1891); Burch v. Savannah, 42 Ga. 596
(1891).
7256 U. S. 450, 41 S. Ct. 551 (1921).
274 U. S. 259, 47 S. Ct. 607 (1927).
'5 Wall 462 (1866). See also Pervear v. Commonwealth of Mass., 5 Wall.
475 (1866).
1' McBAN, PROHImiTiO LEGAL AND ILEGAL 38-39.
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opinion is correct, nullification as a process of government is a
travesty.
It is our contention that by a system of NEGATIVE REGULATIONS the state can penalize what it wants to penalize and in
this manner it can control the time, place, and occasion of the
sale, the quantity and quality of liquor sold, and the persons to
whom liquor may be sold. Suppose the state enforcement act is
repealed and a state statute is passed, providing that liquor shall
not be sold to minors and containing a penalty therefore. This
statute does not, by implication, authorize a sale of liquor to
adults. Or suppose an anti-Sunday selling law is passed, containing penalties. That law does not, by implication, sanction a
sale on week days. The writer is indebted to Mr. Clarence Darrow for the idea of negative regulation. The proposal has been
submitted to two of the outstanding scholars in the field of constitutional law, Professors Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Reed
Powell, of the Harvard Law School, and both declare that the
scheme is within the scope of constitutional possibilities.
We desire at this point to introduce the arguments in favor
of the proposal.
(1) By way of introduction it is necessary to
distinguish between "regulation" and "prohibition."
Professor
Freund in his work on The Police Power' says, "By prohibition
is understood that legislative policy which renders illegal some
entire sphere of business or action, and not merely some particular
mode or form of it, or merely its exercise at a particular time or
in a particular place, so that it would still be possible to engage
in the same pursuit by an accommodation to legal requirements.
With reference to any particular subject matter therefore, partial
prohibition constitutes regulation." As an example, to prohibit
the use of grain for distillation into liquor is upon this principle
mere regulation as far as the owner of the grain is concerned."
Let it be understood that the plan we are advocating can only be
characterized as "regulation" under the above distinction. So
much by way of introduction.'
(2) The states, under the police power, may select and
choose the evils that they want to punish. The sanction of a law
passed in the exercise of the police power is usually a penalty,
and the violation of the law constitutes technically a misdemeanor
or a crime.' A state may classify with reference to an evil to be
"P. 52.
2 Ingram v. State, 39 Ala. 247 (1864).
" MMUND, POLICE POWxa (1904) 21.
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prevented. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The
question is a practical one, dependent upon experience.1'
Mr.
Justice Holmes has said, "The State 'may direct its law against
what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the
whole field of possible abuses'. '
The presumption is that the
legislature acted with knowledge of the facts and conditions."
It has been held that the states "need not denounce every act
committed within their boundaries which is included within the
inhibition of the Volstead Act, nor provide the same penalties
therefor.'
An illustration will aid in making clear the proposition we
are defending. The state of Montana repealed its state prohibition law.19 But in another section of the Code there is still on the
statute books a law providing for a penalty for the sale of liquor
to minors."9 Does anyone doubt that a violator of that law does
not commit an offense against the state for which he can be punished? Does anyone contend that such a law sanctions or authorizes the sale of liquor to adults? That law constitutes a typical
illustration of what we designate as a NEGATIVE, regulation
under a system of state nullification. If that law is valid, is it
not within the constitutional competency of a state under the
police power to make selling of liquor on Sunday an offense? And
if that can be done, why is it not possible to provide for a general
regulation of the time, place and manner of sale, the quality and
quantity of liquor sold, and the place of consumption? The state
can attack the evil piece-meal. It can prohibit what it wants to
prohibit and provide punishment for that. Each separate section constitutes a prohibition, but viewing the problem as a whole,
the policy could be characterized as NEGATIVE regulation. It
would not require extraordinary adroitness in drafting such legislation to keep from drifting into the position in which the state
would be positively legalizing that which the state constitution
condemns. Professor Freund, the great authority on the police
power, has said, "The police power has dealt with and deals with
evils as publio sentiment requires, and that other evils of a different kind, affecting different interests and having different conCoo.xy, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, (8th ed. 1927) 813.
Patsone v. Pa., 232 U. S. 138, 34 S. Ct. 281 (1914).
1 CooLEY, CoNsTITUTIONA LIMITATIONS, op. cit. supra n.14, at 372, n.1,
for list of cases.
17Co-monwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 273 (1920).
9
' MONT. REV. CODE (Supp. 1923-27) p. 1074, § 11048.3.
nh d. § 11048.1.
142
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sequences are not drawn within the range of legislation or that
they are regulateed or restrained in a different manner and treated
with greater severity or leniency, is not deemed sufficient to
invalidate a measure otherwise legitimate, confining itself to some
particular danger.' The effect of such a policy will mean that
where public sentiment in a state allows it, all persons who are
not within the prescribed classes will be enabled to procure
palatable liquor under the circumstances and conditions permitted
by the state law.
In considering this proposal the following propositions should
be kept in mind: (1) the state constitutional amendment is not
self-executing and contains no penalties; (2) the legislature is not
legally obligated to exercise to the hilt the power which is conferred by the amendment; (3) there are three alternatives before
the legislature of West Virginia at the coming session (while the
state prohibition amendment is still in the state constitution).
(a) Leave the prohibition enforcement act on the statute books
and through its non-enforcement play into the hands of the bootleggers and racketeers. This course can only breed a further disrespect for law and will lead to chaos. Further it will not provide
an adequate revenue from the liquor traffic. The strict enforcement of the state enforcement act is outside the scope of practical
possibilities because of the change in public sentiment in West
Virginia as evidenced by the vote on the repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment. (b) Repeal the state enforcement act and fail to
enact any constructive legislation to take its place. This is unthinkable as a solution of the prohibition problem because it will
leave a non-regulated and a non-revenue producing liquor traffic.
(c) The sensible way out is to repeal the state enforcement act and
to enact constructive legislation (1) regulating the traffic through
a system of NEGATIVE REGULATIONS and (2) taxing the
traffic, and draft the legislation in such a manner that neither the
regulatory nor the taxation statutes will authorize anything that
the state constitutional prohibition amendment condemns. Granting that this can only be characterized as nullification, it represents the only sane way out of the prohibition muddle in the
interim.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that nullification as
ordinarily understood, is simply a slogan, a method of attack, a
strategic maneuver. The wets, who in desperation are advocating
2 FREmw, op. cit. supra n. 13, at 740.
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it, have not thought the problem through. As ordinarily understood it would lead to an intolerable situation. If nullification
comes to pass, it should be as a PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT
permitting public opinion expressed through the legislature to
regulate and tax the liquor traffic as best suits its interests. The
plan we have outlined affords the people of West Virginia during
the period until the prohibition amendmeht can be removed from
the state constitution an opportunity to experiment with reference
to the regulation and taxation of the liquor traffic. It is intolerable to think that the people should have their hands tied for this
period, simply because of the cumbersome procedure of the amending process. If the legislature of West Virginia will take advantage of the plan outlined above, we have the right to expect
that a sane and efficient policy with reference to the liquor traffic
will be in force before the date of the repeal of the state constitutional amendment, and such a policy should be made an integral
part of a sensible and adequate tax system for the commonwealth
in the future.
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